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Counter-Mapping the Spaces of Autonomous Driving
In this article I provide an account of key tensions shaping the development of autonomous driving technologies, and 
explore how such tensions can open up avenues for counter-mapping the data spaces produced through these navigation 
technologies. The design and massive commercialization of autonomous vehicles implies the production of new models of 
space, generated through the integration of data collected through technologies such as lidar scanning, machine learning, 
and artificial intelligence. This production of space is bounded within the confines of the technological black boxes of the 
vehicles themselves, as well as the corporate black boxes of the companies that design and deploy them. However, there are 
key sources of tension surrounding the creation of these black boxes: those between market competitors; between the state 
and the private sector; and between civil society, the private sector, and the state. In this article I explore these tensions 
by focusing on the potential for counter-mapping as a means of critique, transparency, and political action across three 
separate aspects of the autonomous driving space-making process: (1) legislation, by examining the emergence of Right 
to Repair laws across the United States, beginning with the Automotive Right to Repair Law passed in Massachusetts 
in 2012; (2) design, through open source projects for building self-driving cars, exemplified by Udacity, a pioneer in this 
area; and (3) hacking, specifically interventions designed to open, critique, or disrupt autonomous driving technologies. 
These examinations are embedded in a political economic account that interrogates the ownership and control over the 
spaces produced through autonomous driving, as well as the economic value associated with such production of space.
K E Y W O R D S :  counter-mapping; autonomous driving; automated mapping; Right to Repair; hacking; artificial intelli-
gence; machine learning; open-source design
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Over the past five years, autonomous vehicles have 
gone from one of many in an expanding constellation of 
innovations to the touchstone technology upon which a 
particular vision of the future is articulated. Autonomous 
vehicles represent a significant step in the integration of the 
digital information economy with the automobile indus-
try (Gao, Hensley, and Zielke 2014; Lipson and Kurman 
2016)—perhaps the archetypal industry of twentieth-cen-
tury capitalism. While there is some evidence that younger 
cohorts prefer ride-sharing as a means of transportation—
which could in principle be satisfied by self-driving cars—
(Krueger, Rashidi, and Rose 2016), there are fundamental 
questions about how (by, and for whom) this technology 
would be deployed. For all the potential benefits of auton-
omous vehicles, the corporate push favoring them over ex-
isting modes of public transportation exceeds any current 
demand, while simultaneously advancing an emerging 
digital urban capitalism that is predicated on the rheto-
ric of “smart” or “data-driven” cities and the intensified 
privatization of services (Cugurullo 2018; Shelton, Zook, 
and Wiig 2015; Wiig 2018). At the heart of autonomous 
navigation is the production of new cartographies that 
allow automated vehicles to be deployed through physical 
spaces—and, in the process, influence economic processes 
as well as the organization of urban systems and transpor-
tation infrastructure (Schlossberg et al. 2018). These maps 
are created through sophisticated, and often proprietary, 
combinations of sensing and mapping technologies, which 
feature continuous, multimodal, and extensive data collec-
tion and processing. Thus, in navigating, and potentially 
transforming, space, autonomous vehicles effectively pro-
duce new virtual spaces through processes enclosed within 
technological as well as corporate black boxes. In combin-
ing pre-existing digital maps with continuously updated 
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spatial databases that respond to the vehicles’ navigation 
of space, the maps at the core of autonomous driving enact 
both the representational and performative possibilities of 
cartography: they are both object and process.
Given the magnitude of the resources invested in autono-
mous vehicles, their expected knock-on effects,1 and their 
potential to reshape cities and socioeconomic organiza-
tion, the mechanisms underlying their navigation of space 
should be more open to public scrutiny, deliberation, and 
regulation. My goal in this article is to expand the emerg-
ing conversation on the politics of autonomous vehicles 
(Bissell 2018; Boeglin 2015; Brodsky 2016; Stilgoe 2018) 
by advancing counter-mapping as a means to open up the 
spaces produced by, and for, autonomous driving. I will 
examine three separate possible avenues for counter-map-
ping: (1) legislation, specifically the emergence of right-to-
repair laws across the United States, beginning with the 
Automotive Right to Repair Law passed in Massachusetts 
in 2012; (2) design, through open source projects for build-
ing self-driving cars, exemplified by Udacity, a pioneer in 
this area; and (3) hacking, specifically interventions pro-
posed or designed to open, critique, or disrupt autono-
mous driving technologies.
I have identified these three aspects because they exem-
plify signif icant nodes of interaction between various 
actors in society, such as the public, interest groups, and 
legislators (legislation); firms, advocate groups, and con-
sumers (design); and counter-cultural groups, regulators, 
information security advocates, and the media (hacking). 
After exploring these avenues, I will embed them in a po-
litical economic account that interrogates the ownership 
and control over the spaces produced through autonomous 
driving, as well as the data-harvesting and economic value 
generation associated with such production of space.
COUNTER-MAPPING
In her foundational contribution describing the struggles 
over forest resources in Kalimantan, Indonesia, Nancy 
Peluso (1995, 384) characterizes counter-mapping as a 
strategy used by local activists and allies to “appropriate 
the state’s techniques and manner of representation to bolster 
the legitimacy of ‘customary’ claims to resources.” Harris 
and Hazen, in turn, provide a more extensive conception 
1. A study commissioned by processor maker Intel, and conducted by the firm Strategy Analytics in 2017, estimates that the widespread adoption of fully automat-
ed vehicles will catalyze a new global passenger economy worth $7 trillion USD by 2050 (Lanctot 2018).
of counter-mapping that incorporates “any effort that fun-
damentally questions the assumptions or biases of carto-
graphic conventions, that challenges predominant power 
effects of mapping, or that engages with mapping in ways 
that upset power relations” (2005, 115). As suggested by 
these definitions, counter-mapping exists and evolves 
through a symbiotic relationship with established, accept-
ed, and conventional technologies of mapping and modes 
of spatial representation, construction, and performance.
Over the past two decades, counter-mapping has closely 
tracked new developments in geospatial data, media, and 
technologies with the aim of turning them on their head 
and critically interrogating their established uses. Counter-
mapping has been used by students and activists speak-
ing against university policies (Counter Cartographies 
Collective, Dalton, and Mason-Deese 2012), indigenous 
peoples staking claims to land and resources (Wainwright 
and Bryan 2009), critics challenging architectural or-
thodoxies (Cattoor and Perkins 2014), researchers seek-
ing to make conservation more equitable and effective 
(Harris and Hazen 2005), migrant advocates identifying 
routes into Europe (Casas-Cortés et al. 2017), activists 
reclaiming queer spaces and lived experiences in the city 
(Gieseking 2016), and scholars exposing privacy viola-
tions and passive data collection (Propen 2005). As these 
wide-ranging examples demonstrate, counter-mapping is 
less defined by any one technology, method, or mode of 
spatial representation, and more by an ethos of challeng-
ing power asymmetries in (and through) the mapping and 
appropriation of space.
Today’s informational environment is increasingly char-
acterized by the ascendance of technologies that bring 
order-of-magnitude increases in the speed, volume, and 
sophistication of data collection and processing (Kitchin 
2014; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). Three well 
publicized, trendsetting examples are social computing, 
blockchain, and artificial intelligence. While these and 
other inf luential technologies can be identified by their 
technical specifications and capabilities, they should also 
be understood through their linkages with and functional 
integration into the dynamics of digital capitalism. In this 
context, counter-mapping has a crucial role to play—mo-
bilized through a variety of new tools and approaches that 
reflect the very technologies used to exert power through 
mapping.
Cartographic Perspectives, Number 92, 2019 Counter-Mapping the Spaces of Autonomous Driving – Alvarez León | 12 
Counter-mapping can be a productive approach in check-
ing and contesting new technical and political-economic 
regimes because its range and generative potential tran-
scends the realm of spatial products (and processes) nar-
rowly defined as “maps.” As a way of thinking, acting, and 
producing spatial and political knowledge from a critical 
standpoint, counter-mapping not only deals with spatial 
objects that are immediately visible; it can also help ex-
cavate them from places that are hidden from plain view, 
or re-enact them through different perspectives. One ex-
ample of this is the realm of “big data” and its emerging 
disciplinary counterpart, “data science.” By counter-map-
ping “data science” itself, Dalton and Stallman (2017) elu-
cidate the spatial relations involved in, and produced by, 
established modes of data production and interpretation—
which are often in the service of powerful actors, such as 
corporations, states, and academic elites. In order to chal-
lenge the power-inflected spatial representations found in 
big data and data science, we can mobilize counter-map-
ping to connect theory and practice, and re-situate it in a 
bottom-up perspective:
Counter-mapping offers both theorists and 
practitioners a way to connect careful, situated 
approaches to data . . . to the enacted practices 
of social organizing and change-making. It can 
combine critical thought and practice to draw 
on data science sources and methods (often de-
veloped by or for large corporations), yet does 
so in a situated, bottom-up manner to realize 
different ends. (Dalton and Stallmann 2017, 3)
Along similar lines, Shannon Mattern (2017) has argued 
for the need to question and challenge the new spatialities 
intertwined with emerging technologies of navigation and 
automated transportation. The growth of automated vehi-
cles—as an industry, as a transportation paradigm, and as 
an ideology of mobility—has been fully embraced by the 
Silicon Valley elite (as well as counterparts in China and 
other countries) and is already transforming the global au-
tomobile industry. In the same way that medieval towns 
bear the imprint of horse-drawn carriages, and twenti-
eth-century cities were (re)organized to accommodate 
(and often privilege) cars, it seems increasingly likely that 
the urban forms of the twenty-first century will be deep-
ly influenced by the expansion of automated vehicles. In 
light of this world in emergence, it is imperative to ask, as 
Mattern does,
. . . critical questions about how machines con-
ceptualize and operationalize space. How do 
they render our world measurable, navigable, 
usable, conservable? We must also ask how 
those artif icial intelligences, with their dig-
ital sensors and deep learning models, inter-
sect with cartographic intelligences and sub-
jectivities beyond the computational “Other.” 
. . . There are a lot of other Others—including 
marginalized and indigenous populations and 
non-human environmental actors—who belong 
on the map, too, and not merely as cartograph-
ic subjects. They are active mapping agents 
with distinct spatial intelligences, and they 
have stakes in the environments we all share. 
(Mattern 2017)
Asking such questions requires prying open the black 
boxes that contain new mappings underlying automat-
ed vehicles. This is not only a technical exercise, but also 
a political act, since such black boxes are the means by 
which new modes of spatial representation, navigation, 
and performance (and, by extension, new articulations of 
power in space) remain hidden from public deliberation. 
Inflected by power and capital as they are, these mappings 
embody the asymmetries at the core of digital capitalism: 
while they use public spaces, personal information, and 
common-pool resources as inputs to generate economic 
value, they remain closed to deliberation or input from 
those who will bear the consequences of their deployment.
Accordingly, actions such as examining, disrupting, re-
pairing, distributing, or reproducing the mechanisms and 
information underlying autonomous navigation often con-
stitute infringements due to their proprietary nature, and 
legislation that reinforces it. These restrictions are part 
and parcel of a growing economy of information and dig-
ital technologies fueled by data collection, and dependent 
upon closed ecosystems as a way of ensuring profits.
Counter-mapping, as an ethos that can be put in practice 
though myriad techniques, actions, and perspectives, of-
fers a promising opportunity to take apart the spaces pro-
duced within the black boxes of autonomous vehicles and 
the corporations that own them, in order to reconstruct 
them for other means. A provocative potential outcome, 
suggested by Manaugh (2016), is to make use of spaces 
of misdirection that, instead of making a robot-readable 
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world, create one that is illegible to them. While the pre-
cise nature of the world we build should be the product of 
collective deliberation and participatory decision-making, 
a necessary step is to reclaim agency from the technical 
and economic assemblages (such as autonomous vehicles) 
that are currently redrawing the very spaces where we cir-
culate and inhabit. The mapping conducted by autonomous 
vehicles follows two general approaches, each of which re-
lies on particular technological configurations, and carries 
with it potentially different space-making consequences:
One aims to create complete high-definition 
maps that will let the driverless cars of the fu-
ture navigate all on their own; another creates 
maps piece-by-piece, using sensors in today’s 
vehicles that will allow cars to gradually auto-
mate more and more parts of driving. (Bergen 
2018)
Each of these approaches captures the world in a particu-
lar way, representing and recreating it in a manner that is 
suitable for a specific array of navigational technologies—
often backed by a collection of corporate interests and 
alliances betting on the “winning” combination (Bergen 
2018; Evans 2017; Hook and Bott 2018). Once captured, 
this three-dimensional re-creation of the world then be-
comes the setting for action of the vehicle itself, as well as 
those who make decisions about its navigation (including 
the human passengers who input directions, the engineers 
who design how the car will determine its path, and the 
advertisers analyzing new data streams for optimal place-
ments along the way). However, the potential for action 
embedded in these mappings transcends the immediate 
navigational needs of the vehicle, since they can be used 
for decision making in other realms, such as managing 
traffic patterns, conducting street repairs, surveillance, 
marketing, urban planning, and even infrastructural up-
grades. Yet, these activities are tied to, and would depend 
directly on, the type, quality, and characteristics of the 
spatial information collected and presented by the navi-
gational technologies that produce such mappings—all of 
which are secretly guarded within technological and cor-
porate black boxes.
In this article, I propose three specific avenues through 
which counter-mapping can be mobilized to open the 
black boxes of autonomous driving for deliberation, con-
testation, and transformation. In the next section I show 
how legislation, design, and hacking can challenge the 
technical, legal, and corporate barriers that guard the pro-
duction of spaces at the core of autonomous driving. In the 
subsequent section, I integrate insights from these avenues 
into a political economic account centered on the owner-
ship and control of spaces in the context of automated ve-
hicles, and the generative potential (along with potential 
ramifications) of counter-mapping to facilitate alternative 
orders. The final section suggests future directions of in-
quiry and political intervention.
AV E N U ES  F O R  CO U N T E R- M A P P I N G
LEGISLATION
Starting in the 1990s, auto manufacturers positioned 
themselves as gatekeepers of the information required to 
repair (increasingly computerized) car systems, as well as 
who is authorized to do so. A practical consequence of this 
has been the funneling of repair work to manufacturer-au-
thorized car dealerships, to the disadvantage of indepen-
dent mechanics and auto repair shops (Kessler 2017). As 
cars become digitally networked to auto manufacturers, 
other cars, or even infrastructure, the issue of access to car 
data by third-party repair services will become a more sa-
lient point of contention both for mechanics and for con-
sumers. However, these discussions can also inform de-
bates on broader issues about ownership and access to any 
sort of digital information collected by, and stored within 
automobiles. In light of the ongoing computerization and 
networking of cars, repair data constitute a useful (legal 
and conceptual) precedent for the expanding data ecosys-
tems of automated vehicles.
The high barriers and costs to repair automobiles have 
galvanized grassroots movements that aim to broaden ac-
cess to repair capabilities. Cars have become a focal point 
in the emerging Right to Repair movement due to their 
intensified computerization, the growing momentum of 
automated vehicles, and the size of the aftermarket for 
third-party repair services. As one mechanic put it, the 
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survival of the trade is contingent on “fair and equal ac-
cess to data, information, and training” (Kessler 2017). 
Furthermore, calls for the right to repair are symptomat-
ic of broader contestations challenging restrictive notions 
of ownership and closed access that have come to define 
digital capitalism (Perzanowski and Schultz 2016). Thus, 
organizations representing users of smartphones, com-
puters, printer cartridges, and other electronics—such as 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org/issues/right-
to-repair), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/conservation/
why-we-must-fight-for-the-right-to-repair-our-electron-
ics), and iFixit (ifixit.org/right)—have expressed their 
discontent with what they see as restrictive (and wasteful) 
practices by the corporations that seek to control, not only 
the manufacture and distribution, but also the use, trans-
formation, and resale of products.
These informational enclosures have catalyzed a legislative 
movement in the United States aimed at making repair in-
formation available to consumers as well as independent 
shops. At the federal level, the first Right to Repair bill 
was introduced in 2001, but was not adopted. In 2013, 
after reconciling two separate laws enacted the previous 
year, Massachusetts passed the first Right to Repair leg-
islation (An Act Relative to Automotive Repair 2013). In 
2017, the state’s Consumer Protection and Professional 
Licensure Committee heard legislation that would expand 
the Right to Repair to cover all types of electronics sold 
in the state. As it continues to be considered by the legis-
lature, this expansion is actively opposed by manufactur-
ers in the appliance, video game, electronics, and medical 
device industries, along with others that have a financial 
stake in maintaining control of the repair services market 
(Metzger 2017).
The original Massachusetts Right to Repair legislation led 
to a Memorandum of Understanding between automakers 
(represented by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
and the Association of Global Automakers) and third-par-
ty service providers (represented by the Automotive 
Aftermarket Industry Association, and the Coalition for 
Auto Repair Equality), in which the former committed to 
provide the necessary information for repairs to the lat-
ter, beginning with 2018 car models across all 50 U.S. 
states (Bassett 2016). However, while at the time of this 
writing eighteen states2 have introduced legislation on the 
2. These are: Washington, Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, and California.
Right to Repair electronics and other devices (www.thev-
erge.com/2018/3/8/17097256/california-right-to-re-
pair-bill-apple-microsoft-service-replace-parts), it re-
mains unclear how the Right to Repair movement and 
ensuing legislation will inform the governance of data 
collected by automated vehicles once their use is more 
widespread. An important point to consider is the chang-
ing nature of technology, and its slippery relationship with 
legislation, which is often less dynamic. In the case of au-
tomobiles, the 2014 agreement to share car data with re-
pair shops represents a step in the direction of a more open 
informational environment. However, next-generation 
vehicles, which are both automated and connected to dig-
ital networks, bring qualitative changes in the collection 
and storage of data, well beyond what is covered in ex-
isting Right to Repair agreements (Kessler 2017). While 
the contentions over car data have heretofore focused on 
repair codes, the mappings produced by self-driving cars 
are made of data captured from their surroundings, in-
cluding people, places, and communications along their 
path. The contentious history of Google cars intercepting 
wifi communications while capturing Street View images 
highlights the implications of this emerging technological 
debate for privacy and security, among other fundamental 
issues (Burdon and McKillop 2013).
The experience of the Right to Repair movement, and 
legislation it has pushed in the United States, illustrates 
that it is possible to open the closed informational envi-
ronments that have come to dominate digital capitalism. 
The Right to Repair addresses a fundamental imbalance of 
data access between manufacturers, on the one hand, and 
consumers and third-party service providers, on the other 
hand. However, the data collected by connected and auto-
mated vehicles are both harder to access by non-authorized 
parties (as they circulate through closed networks under 
manufacturer control), and more valuable for purposes be-
yond car repair. Indeed, as cars come to rely completely on 
a vast array of sensors for navigation, the possibilities for 
profit multiply through the marketization of collected data 
about user habits, preferences, identity, locations, routes, 
and surroundings, as well as subscription services such as 
navigation guidance, emergency assistance, and onboard 
entertainment systems. This portends a more thorough 
reconfiguration of spatial information (and space itself) 
towards the logic embedded in applications like Yelp and 
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Google Maps, which are designed to facilitate consump-
tion in, and of, space, as a primary activity.
In this respect, the Right to Repair presents an avenue 
that addresses the data pipeline of the car only inasmuch 
as it concerns the repair of the vehicle itself. Yet, with cars 
becoming increasingly sophisticated collections of com-
puters, “car repair” only covers what is already a shrink-
ing aspect of the car data environment. In fact, automated 
vehicles are no longer merely cars, but are instead, as one 
commentator has called them, “data harvesting machines” 
that are connected to a diverse assortment of services 
(Kaminska 2017). In turn, these data harvesting machines 
rely on spatial representations to navigate space, while cre-
ating economic value out of such representations, and po-
tentially transforming space itself in the process. In this 
emerging environment of pervasively commodified spatial 
data flows, it is necessary to have a more open and deliber-
ative process informing the public what data are collected 
by automated vehicles, what is done with said data, and 
who can appropriate and profit from them.
As Right to Repair movements and legislation have al-
ready demonstrated, grassroots movements can be success-
ful in exerting the pressure necessary to open the closed 
data pipelines under corporate control. While initially this 
success has been aimed at repair activities, more attention 
should be directed to tracing the flows of vehicle data and 
accounting for their expanding uses and applications. In 
particular, as increasingly automated cars come to rely on 
complex mappings to navigate, the process of how these 
are assembled and commodified should be made transpar-
ent and open for public deliberation. Concomitant with 
lobbying efforts for new legislation on this front, below I 
discuss the possibilities presented by two additional ave-
nues of potential intervention: design and hacking.
DESIGN
Udacity is an online, STEM-focused, education company 
co-founded by Sebastian Thrun, who led the development 
of the Google self-driving car and won the 2005 DARPA 
Grand Challenge—the foremost competition of autono-
mous vehicles, funded by the US Department of Defense. 
Udacity’s aim is to prepare students for jobs in the infor-
mation technology industry. Given this focus, and the in-
terests of its founders, one of the first courses it offered was 
titled “Building a Robotic Car,” taught by Thrun in 2012. 
This has expanded into a “nanodegree” entirely devoted to 
providing students with skills to “complete the journey to 
a Self-driving Car career” (Udacity 2017).
In parallel to expanding the formal courses and certifi-
cates focused on self-driving cars, Udacity is building its 
own version of this technology as an open source project. 
After outfitting a 2016 Lincoln MKZ with lidar, radar, 
cameras, and other equipment, Udacity configured the 
Robot Operating System (ROS), and opened the code “to 
build and refine an open source self-driving car with the 
help of students from around the world” (Cameron 2016). 
This project consists of various discrete tasks, which ad-
dress individual components of the autonomous vehicle, 
and are open for public participation. The code is managed 
through a GitHub repository, and users can communicate 
through the Slack messaging platform, using an account 
dedicated to this project. At the time of this writing, the 
open source project page on the Udacity website (udaci-
ty.com/self-driving-car) redirects to the Self-driving Car 
Nanodegree page, suggesting a pivot back to the compa-
ny’s core mission of selling online educational services.
While Udacity has leveraged its partnerships with top aca-
demic institutions such as Stanford and Carnegie Mellon, 
as well as leading companies in the automobile (Mercedez-
Benz, Honda), ride-sharing (Uber), and information tech-
nology (IBM, Nvidia) industries to entice students with 
an inside track into high-paying engineering jobs, anoth-
er open source self-driving car initiative is developing on 
the outside of this environment, and with a different set 
of goals: the Open-Source Self-driving Car Initiative, or 
OSSDC (ossdc.org). The differences between these two 
open source projects are illustrative of the range of orien-
tations that can develop through open source projects, and 
can point to the possibility of future initiatives explicitly 
aimed at critiquing and contesting the collection, use, and 
commodification of self-driving car data.
Marius Slavescu, a Toronto-based inventor, started 
the Open-Source Self-driving Car Initiative in 2016 
after he joined Udacity’s Open Source Self-driving Car 
Challenges. According to OSSDC’s Mission and Vision 
statement, this initiative was created, “to bring together 
the best open source technologies and open research to 
allow anyone (not only experts) build affordable self-driv-
ing cars and autonomous mobile robots in a DIY manner 
[sic], from toy size (RC cars) to full size (full size cars)” 
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(Slavescu 2017b; 2017c). The basic structure of OSSDC 
largely mirrors that of Udacity’s project: code is shared 
through a GitHub repository, and communication be-
tween members takes place through Slack. While OSSDC 
is still in its infancy, and many of its core components are 
in flux (such as its website, which is still missing import-
ant content, or its logo—an upside down car that is the 
topic of much discussion by contributors), its divergence 
from the corporate orientation of Udacity (as a feeder for 
the self-driving car industry) has been made clear from the 
outset. For example, in the context of a discussion about 
the design specifications of the logo for OSSDC, Slavescu 
expanded on his outlook for the orientation of this initia-
tive, explicitly looking to transcend commercial goals:
I’m looking for people that really want to 
contribute to Open Source Self-driving Car 
Initiative, and make it applicable to many SDC 
and robotics projects, instead of just looking to 
build next Uber (not that is anything wrong 
with that [sic]).
In my opinion, OSSDC.org is an organization 
that should be a model for the future, where 
people join to Learn, Teach, Invent, Make, 
participate and contribute their expertize 
[sic] in open ways (through OSSDC GitHub 
Organization), for the good of everyone, not 
just for their employees or investors. (Slavescu 
2017a)
Whether OSSDC will survive with this outlook (if at all), 
or mutate to adopt a different ethos, is too soon to tell. 
However, this initiative’s existence illustrates a viable form 
of non-commercial organization to tackle the develop-
ment of an emerging and particularly complex technolo-
gy. On the other hand, OSSDC also exemplifies, through 
its tentative beginnings and lack of clear organization, the 
difficulties of existing and expanding in the self-driving 
car technology environment without the explicit support 
from, or integration into, a corporate pipeline.
As shown by Udacity, opening the code and development 
of a self-driving car can be beneficial in identifying poten-
tial job candidates for the industry, and even developing 
innovative technological solutions through collaboration. 
3. Many of the data collection methods that are present in self-driving cars have previously been subject to litigation and government investigation in the US and 
various European countries during their deployment by Google Street View vehicles —in particular the collection of Wi-Fi network data along photographed 
routes. For an overview of these cases, see Blitz (2012), Electronic Privacy Information Center (2010), and Geissler (2012).
This strategy has also been embraced by Baidu, the lead-
ing search engine in China, which has taken it one step 
further. Baidu has announced the gradual opening of 
its entire self-driving technology stack, named Project 
Apollo, starting in a limited environment in 2017 and re-
leasing full self-driving software by 2020 (Muoio 2017). 
In this case, Baidu’s goal is to drive the development of the 
self-driving car industry through community input, while 
retaining the position to commercialize a finished product.
The different strategies embraced by Baidu and Udacity, 
on the commercial side, and OSSDC on the not-for-profit 
side, illustrate how the emerging landscape of self-driving 
cars is colored by the enormous economic rewards prom-
ised by this technology. While open source as a practice 
has the potential to disrupt asymmetric power arrange-
ments in the self-driving car environment, it can also 
be leveraged as a strategy to reinforce them. OSSDC is 
meaningful as precedent for a self-organized open source 
initiative focused on self-driving cars. Yet, it does not di-
rectly address the issues surrounding collection, use, and 
appropriation of data by these vehicles. This is particularly 
important in the context of the pervasive, multimodal data 
collection enabled by automated vehicles. Open source 
design can offer a window into understanding, critiquing, 
and checking the specific mechanisms by which these ve-
hicles capture highly granular, personal (and potentially 
illegal) data on location, routes, and user behavior, and 
integrate them into virtual spatial representations.3 Such 
a window would provide the opportunity for public scruti-
ny into concerns central to the deployment of self-driving 
cars, such as the relationship between a vehicle’s software, 
data, and technological configuration, on the one hand, 
and the assessment of questions of liability, reliability, and 
safety, on the other. It is through the window offered by 
open source design that potential counter-mappings can 
then advance alternative spatial representations.
Thus, in a similar way that targeted movements are re-
quired to promote legislation that explicitly addresses 
the power asymmetries shaping the self-driving car data 
pipeline, new open source initiatives will have to emerge 
that are geared towards demanding data transparency, 
proposing alternative technologies, and building frame-
works for contestation. An element that can position open 
source initiatives as an alternative, and counter, to the 
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corporate-dominated self-driving car ecosystem, is hack-
ing. Both as a technical practice, and an ethic of disrup-
tion, hacking can be an avenue for critiques of self-driv-
ing car development, as well as a tool to open the black 
boxes of technical and corporate control that contain the 
data collected by self-driving cars. In the next subsection, 
I examine two recent instances of automated vehicle hack-
ing and explore how these can be used to inform a count-
er-mapping movement in the context of self-driving cars.
HACKING
In 2015, Charlie Miller, a security researcher at Twitter, 
and Chris Valasek, Director of Vehicle Security at the 
information security firm IOActive, remotely hacked the 
computers of a 2014 Jeep Cherokee, gaining control of the 
vehicle’s steering, transmission, and brakes. This was a sig-
nificant leap from their hacking of a Toyota Prius and a 
Ford Escape in 2013, which took place with their com-
puters physically connected to the cars’ onboard diagnostic 
ports (Greenberg 2015). The progression towards wireless 
hacking is both indicative of the auto industry’s trend of 
making vehicles more connected, and a serious warning 
ahead of the massive deployment of fleets of networked 
autonomous vehicles. Miller and Valasek shared their 
findings with Fiat Chrysler, the maker of Jeep Cherokee, 
and published a comprehensive guide exposing its security 
vulnerabilities (Miller and Valasek 2015), with the aim of 
alerting automakers of the potential security flaws while 
simultaneously putting pressure on them by stoking public 
opinion.
In the process of remotely hacking into the Jeep Cherokee, 
Valasek and Miller relied on the car computer’s capabilities 
of communication, location, and automation, and exploit-
ed their vulnerabilities over cellular data networks (Miller 
and Valasek 2015). Through this exercise, they showed 
that, by gaining access to a vehicle, hackers can directly 
manipulate its trajectory and actions, as well as track its 
user’s movement patterns, location, and behavior from 
long distances. While this is already a significant issue due 
to the large number of digitally connected vehicles in the 
market, the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles 
will only worsen the implications for privacy, cyber-securi-
ty, and public safety.
The work of Valasek and Miller, though initially down-
played by auto manufacturers, has gained the attention of 
some US legislators, who have proposed legislation spe-
cifically aimed at addressing the flaws exposed by remote 
vehicle exploitation. The Security and Privacy in Your 
Car (SPY Car) Act of 2015 was sponsored by Senator Ed 
Markey, with the aim of
[directing] the National Highway Traff ic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) to conduct a 
rulemaking to issue motor vehicle cybersecurity 
regulations that require motor vehicles manu-
factured for sale in the United States to protect 
against unauthorized access to: (1) electronic 
controls or driving data, including information 
about the vehicle’s location, speed, owner, driv-
er, or passengers; or (2) driving data collected 
by electronic systems built into a vehicle while 
that data is stored onboard the vehicle, in tran-
sit from the vehicle to another location, or sub-
sequently stored or used off-board the vehicle. 
The regulations must require vehicles with ac-
cessible data or control signals to be capable of 
detecting, reporting, and stopping attempts to 
intercept such driving data or control the ve-
hicle. (Security and Privacy in Your Car Act 
2015)
The bill was read twice on the Senate floor and eventual-
ly referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation. Two years later, in 2017, Senator Markey 
reintroduced the bill, which to date has repeated its path 
through the Senate, having been referred to the same 
Committee, where it remains. Thus, while many legisla-
tors have stated that vehicle cybersecurity is a top priority, 
to date no new legislation has materialized (Armerding 
2017). Episodes of remote vehicle hacking, such as that 
carried out by Miller and Valasek, or the Tesla car hacks 
in 2016 and 2017 by researchers from Keen Security Lab, 
part of Chinese technology leader Tencent (Weise 2017), 
have informed legislative discussions on improving securi-
ty by pinpointing specific, and exploitable, flaws. However, 
the slow legislative pace and the competition between au-
tomakers towards increasingly interconnected vehicles 
constitute serious obstacles to a more secure environment. 
Furthermore, these hacking instances demonstrate the 
importance of location data, as well as other forms of spa-
tial data collected and processed by cars, since they can 
be used (among other applications) to identify, as well as 
disrupt and control the movements—and potentially the 
safety—of car passengers.
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In another instance of hacking that has significant rami-
fications for self-driving cars, George Hotz (who became 
famous for being the first person to “ jailbreak” an iPhone 
in 2007) recently pioneered an open source self-driving 
platform called openpilot (spelled in lowercase on their 
GitHub page, github.com/commaai/openpilot). With the 
help of a smartphone, this platform can enhance exist-
ing car systems (such as lane detection and assisted park-
ing), endowing them with “semi self-driving” capabilities. 
Developed through Hotz’s company, comma.ai (also low-
ercase), the platform was originally set to be an aftermar-
ket kit, commercially available for $999 USD. However, 
after receiving a letter from the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, which threatened fines for selling 
untested self-driving technology to the public, Hotz de-
cided to release it publicly as open code (Zaleski 2107). 
While Hotz has stressed the research purposes of this re-
lease, he has also outlined a commercial strategy for open-
pilot, which distances itself from the hardware, and focus-
es on the data network underlying self-driving cars:
Hotz compared Open Pilot [sic] to Android, 
and said that it’s really aimed at “hobbyists and 
researchers and people who love” self-driving 
technology. “It’s for people who want to push 
the future forward,” he said. When asked how 
or if Comma.ai [sic] plans to make any money 
off of this project, Hotz responded: “How does 
anybody make money? Our goal is to basically 
own the network. We want to own the network 
of self-driving cars that is out there.” (O’Kane 
and Goode 2016)
In effect, if adopted massively, openpilot would assist peo-
ple in hacking into their own vehicles for the purpose of 
transforming them into (at least-partial) self-driving cars 
and connect them to a network of car data f lows that 
comma.ai would be in a position to monetize. To this end, 
the next iteration of comma.ai’s efforts has been the devel-
opment of a “decoder” that lets users monitor and interpret 
the data collected by their cars. The goal is to “democratize 
access to the decoder ring for your car” (comma.ai 2017). 
According to Hotz, his technology gives users access to 
all the same car data that manufacturers can access, from 
fuel use, to RPMs, to driver behavior—thus leveling the 
playing field and allowing individuals to train their own 
self-driving cars. As cars become increasingly autono-
mous, this type of technology can potentially allow users 
to examine the data pipeline that feeds into the mappings 
underpinning automated navigation. This, in turn, can 
empower individuals, user communities, grassroots orga-
nizations, or regulators to construct alternative narratives, 
arguments, and representations in order to hold car manu-
facturers accountable, demand transparency, or check the 
quality of the data-driven services they receive. On the 
other hand, a more open car data environment can also 
expose existing security vulnerabilities in networked and 
automated systems, or even create new ones that endanger 
the users of such technologies and the public in general.
Yet, while giving users the tools to view and interpret their 
vehicle’s data may constitute, in and of itself, a democrat-
ic exercise in the eyes of Hotz, it is fully subordinated to 
the logic of an emerging market for car data. Not coin-
cidentally, comma.ai’s innovations are well positioned to 
successfully exploit the potential profits from said market. 
As he suggested in a recent interview with the libertarian 
outlet Reason, Hotz’s idea of openness is characterized by a 
form of collective sharing that comes with a profit impera-
tive; this imperative is necessarily fulfilled through market 
action:
I don’t want to have a monopoly on data. This is 
the old way of thinking. What if we could open 
our data up more, and really think about it, not 
as like, “Facebook owns this data, Google owns 
this data,” but we all collectively own the data 
and you’re contributing to a big collective pool 
of data. . . . Now it’s a market, it’s not like, “Oh 
we’re all going to do this for smiles and roses,” 
or whatever communists have, but no we’re 
going to do it for you know, [inaudible] the 
market. Create this data, contribute to this, all 
the data combined is a whole lot more powerful 
than any piece of the data alone and I think we 
can do incredible things with these sort of data 
sets, right? (Monticello 2017)
The double-edged sword of empowering users to access 
and interpret their own vehicle data, while creating a 
market for it, exemplifies one of the defining tensions of 
digital capitalism. Therefore, in light of technological ad-
vances, such as those put forth by comma.ai and various 
other open source initiatives, a fuller political economic 
examination of self-driving car data must be conducted. 
This examination should read the dynamics of legislation, 
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open source design, and hacking (among other elements) 
in a political economic context that considers the power 
asymmetries and monetary incentives inherent to the en-
tire self-driving car ecosystem, and its integration into 
digital capitalism. It is only through such analysis that we 
can have both a clearer understanding of how new data 
spaces are being created inside self-driving vehicles, how 
they contribute to reshaping the physical and social world, 
and how we can build initiatives that question, regulate, 
and open this process to public deliberation.
CO U N T ER-M A PP I N G  T H E  DATA  SPACES  O F  AU TO N O M O US  D R IV I N G
As autonomous vehicles continue to improve, they 
are raising important questions of ownership, security, 
privacy, liability, and even competition. Yet, the conver-
sations around this innovation and its consequences have 
so far been centered on the cars themselves, as well as the 
technologies that can allow them to become autonomous. 
This is for good reason, since the widespread deployment 
of self-driving cars has enormous societal consequences, 
the most immediate of which have to do with how safe-
ly they perform on the roads. However, underlying—and 
enabling—this technological development, is an emerging 
data ecosystem generated by the massive collection of fine-
grained vehicle data about the cars themselves as well as 
the landscape they navigate, and even the users that drive 
them. This data ecosystem—much of which is assembled 
into highly complex mappings through lidar point clouds, 
photography, GPS-enabled navigation, image recognition, 
and other technologies—constitutes a core component of 
the political economy of automated vehicles.
Self-driving cars constitute an extension of an established 
industry—the automobile industry—into digital capital-
ism through intensified exchanges with other cutting-edge 
industries such as those of information, geospatial tech-
nologies, and robotics. On the other hand, the structures 
underpinning the collection, use, and monetization of data 
harvested by self-driving cars are made in the crucible of 
the digital economy. The business models of Google and 
Facebook shape the emerging autonomous vehicle data 
ecosystem to a greater degree than existing strategies of 
the automobile industry. Bringing cars into a digital, net-
worked environment of monetized data flows realigns the 
auto industry’s economic incentives and articulations of 
power with broad ramifications. The emerging automated 
navigation landscape is assembled through new config-
urations that include both incumbents and new entrants 
across information, robotics, geospatial, automobile, and 
other technology industries, along with subnational and 
national authorities across various countries, grassroots or-
ganizations, and communities of users.
As the previous sections illustrated, the development and 
deployment of autonomous vehicles raises, among others, 
important questions about ownership, privacy, and secu-
rity—of vehicles, as well as data (with an increasing em-
phasis on spatial data). Consequently, new movements and 
initiatives, spanning a number of domains, are contesting 
the closed structures of access and ownership upon which 
the automated vehicle order is premised. However, as the 
Right to Repair movement and legislation in the US also 
show, while these have achieved success in pushing back 
against restrictive practices from automakers, they have 
done so in large part because this pushback is aligned with 
the interests of another powerful industry, which is that 
of the aftermarket for car products and repair services. 
A similar situation can be seen in the open source move-
ment for self-driving cars, where the leading initiatives are 
those that are either training people for employment in the 
self-driving car industry (such as Udacity), or using open 
source as a new strategy for technological innovation and 
ensuring a leading position in the market (Baidu).
While hacking can potentially bring more agency to users 
and mobilize regulation aimed at increasing security, 
transparency, and accountability of manufacturers, these 
same practices can pose important security risks to driv-
ers, pedestrians, and the public in general. Public infra-
structure can be endangered, and hackers can potentially 
compromise sensitive information while feeding under-
ground data markets. Yet, in spite of these significant im-
plications, legislation on this front has so far been stalled, 
while the most dynamic hacking initiatives (such as Geoge 
Hotz’s openpilot) are—in Facebook-speak—“moving fast 
and breaking things,” embracing the liberating rhetoric of 
open source and spurred by the promise of rewards from a 
leading market position to monetize car data flows. This 
Cartographic Perspectives, Number 92, 2019 Counter-Mapping the Spaces of Autonomous Driving – Alvarez León | 20 
should be no surprise, given the system of incentives that 
undergirds digital capitalism, which privileges innovation 
over security, and monetization over privacy and other 
users’ rights. As Miller and Valasek’s car hacking demon-
strations have shown, the race for automated navigation 
leads automakers to compete over the release of new tech-
nical features, and new revenue streams, while paying sec-
ondary attention to the possible negative externalities for 
consumers.
Carefully assessing the risks brought by each of these av-
enues, I suggest that we can also explore their potential to 
open the black boxes of autonomous driving under the um-
brella of counter-mapping. This can encompass, through a 
self-reflective approach, the technical analysis, the ethics 
of contestation, and the construction of alternatives nec-
essary to provide a much-needed counterbalance to the 
capitalist imperative driving the self-driving car industry. 
In particular, it is essential to open for public debate, and 
achieve a broader understanding of, how autonomous ve-
hicles re-create and navigate space. This is crucial because 
the mappings underlying autonomous navigation are also 
the mappings underlying potential transformations of 
space, since the rise of self-driving cars cannot be divorced 
from the economic logics and incentives that define digital 
capitalism, nor can it be understood separately from the 
technocratic promises (and perils) of the corporate-driven 
smart city rhetoric (Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015; Wiig 
2015). This ongoing counter-mapping can involve a cri-
tique and a re-creation of the virtual spaces made by (and 
for) autonomous navigation. Attending to the data spac-
es collected by cars (as they become “data harvesting ma-
chines”) and tracing how these data spaces are assembled, 
used, and appropriated, counter-mapping can provide an 
integrative perspective that allows us to consider, monitor, 
and deliberate over the entire data ecosystem, while iden-
tifying opportunities for concerted political action.
CO N C L U S I O N
As counter-mapping has shown in instances rang-
ing from indigenous land claims to data privacy, the struc-
tures of power underlying technological and informational 
paradigms can be contested by turning these paradigms’ 
mapping technologies onto themselves. Counter-mapping, 
as an ethos and an evolving set of practices, can achieve 
this by developing in parallel to the very tools used by 
those actors who have the power to “map.” The epistemo-
logical and political tasks enabled by counter-mapping are 
thus necessary to hold mapping powers to account precise-
ly because mapping is not just a representation of particu-
lar visions of the world, but also a means of enacting them. 
In this respect, the mappings performed by autonomous 
vehicles not only create a vision of the world suitable for 
navigation, but also for the capital imperative of monetiz-
ing those spatial representations. Beyond this, once mas-
sively deployed and adopted, autonomous cars could have 
the power to reproduce their internal spatial representa-
tions onto the physical world by exerting change on trans-
portation systems, flows of capital, industrial organization, 
policymaking priorities, and social practices.
In light of these vast ramifications, it is imperative to de-
velop strategies to critically examine the production of 
space within autonomous vehicles, and open up this pro-
cess for wider participation. I have argued here that count-
er-mapping represents an integrative perspective that can 
incorporate several avenues through which autonomous 
vehicle data collection, use, and appropriation can be cri-
tiqued and contested. Legislation, open source design, 
and hacking represent a subset of the potential avenues for 
counter-mapping the data spaces produced and networked 
by autonomous vehicles. However, each of these has to be 
critically evaluated for how they are positioned with re-
spect to the systems of incentives that structure digital 
capitalism. Mobilizing these practices for the purposes of 
contestation requires a pushback against the imperatives 
towards profit and corporate control that so often shape 
their trajectory. Counter-mapping, as an ethos and an 
evolving set of practices, can thus contribute to the build-
ing of alternatives to the black-boxed construction of new 
data spaces, often hidden from public input and delibera-
tion, and which underpin what is often advertised as the 
inevitable, automated, order of things to come.
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